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RECENT CASE NOTES
CONFLICT OF LAWS - WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
FULL FAITH AND CREDIT
Plaintiff, a resident of Missouri, was hired in Missouri, by one
Hogan, a Missouri employer, to do work in Arkansas in pursuance
of a subcontract held by Hogan and let by Lanza, the prime con-
tractor, who was neither a resident of Missouri nor of Arkansas.
The plaintiff, Carrol, was injured while working in Arkansas, and
subsequently Hogan's insurer voluntarily began to pay workmen's
compensation to Carrol pursuant to Missouri law. The Missouri
Workmen's Compensation Act contains an extra-territorial provi-
sion and provides that the remedies set forth in the act are to be
exclusive of all other remedies. While receiving these payments,
Carrol sued Lanza in Arkansas in a common law tort action. Held:
The full faith and credit clause of the United States Constitution
does not require that Arkansas' courts bar Carrol's recovery in
recognition of the Missouri statute. Carrol v. Lanza, 349 U.S.
870 (1955).
In cases such as the principal case, where the employee is hired
in his home state to work in another state where he is injured,
and he seeks to recover in the state of the injury although the
state of his residence provides relief through its workmen's com-
pensation laws, the courts have distinguished certain systematized
fact situations. The first such situation is where there has been a
recovery by final award under the workmen's compensation act
in the home state. Here the plaintiff's cause of action is deemed to
be merged in the judgment, and it is held that no further relief
can be obtained anywhere. Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320
U.S. 430 (1943). The second instance is where the workmen's
compensation act of the home state purports to provide the exclu-
sive remedy for injuries occurring either within or without the
boundaries of the state, and the employee has received payments
under this act, but without any adjudication. Here the Supreme
Court has held, where a common law tort action was brought in
the state where the injury occurred, that the full faith and credit
clause of the United States Constitution requires that state to give
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effect to the home state's act and remit the employee to the
proper forum to seek his remedy. Bradford Electric Light Co. v.
Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932). The third situation is where the
workmen's compensation statutes of both the home state and the
state of the forum purport to provide the exclusive remedy, and
the employee seeks recovery under such statutes in the state of
the injury. Here the court has held that the state where the injury
occurs can provide its own remedy, the "exclusive remedy" pro-
vision of the home state's act notwithstanding. Pacific Employers
Insurance Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 306 U.S. 493
(1939). Conversly, where suit is brought in the home state it need
not give effect to the act of the state where the injury occurred.
Alaska Packers v. Industrial Accident Commission, 244 U.S. 532
(1935).
In the Clapper case where the employee and employer resided
in Vermont and had a Vermont contract of employment, but was
injured while working in New Hampshire, the court spoke in
terms of which state has the paramount interests to protect. In
determining this the court looked to the policy of the two states
on these matters and concluded that Vermont had the paramount
interest. This interest was evidenced by the policy of the state as
set out in its act. The court also took into account interests that
were evidenced by the fact that the employee was working under
a Vermont contract of employment, all his relatives lived in Ver-
mont, etc.
These "other interests" became more important in the language
of the court in the Pacific Employers case and the Alaska Packers
case. When the court looked to the acts of the two states here, it
found both had the "exclusive remedy" provision. Interest, then,
determined by the state's policy on the matter as set out in the
acts of the two states, was exactly equal. Therefore the court
allowed these "other interests" to determine which state had para-
mount interest, and held that the state where the injury occurred, as
in the Pacific Employers case, need not give effect to the home
state's act, since the state of the forum had interests of its own
to protect.
In the principle case the Supreme Court held that Arkansas can
open her courts to the plaintiff and allow him his common law
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remedy notwithstanding the Missouri Act providing the exclusive
remedy. The court again sought to determine which state had the
paramount interest. However, a contrary holding would not have
been against any affirmative policy of the state of Arkansas, be-
cause in this instance Arkansas did not even purport to provide
the exclusive remedy as to this particular prime contractor. He
was merely a negligent third party as far as Arkansas was con-
cerned. Also the plaintiff here received no treatment in Arkansas
and had no relatives there. The court further gave no weight to
the attempted distinction between this case and the Pacific Em-
ployers case to the effect that in this case Arkansas was not even
enforcing rights provided for by her Compensation Act but was
instead allowing recovery in a common law tort action. The
court dismissed the argument by saying that no such distinction
was practical. The dissent in the principal case placed consider-
able weight on the Congressional change in 28 U.S.C. § 1738
(1948). Prior to the change the section read "And the said records
and judicial proceedings. . ." In 1948 it was changed to read
"Such acts, records and Judicial proceedings shall have the same
full faith and credit . . ." The change would tend to show that
the leglislative intent is in favor of each state upholding the other's
Compensation Act.
The decision seems to be a continuation of the current trend to
to give every benefit possible to the employee. It apparently over-
rules the Clapper case, since the two are in direct conflict, although
the court clouds the question considerably by expressly referring
to the Clapper case and denying any intent to overrule it. The
principal case would also seem to add to the Pacific Employers
case in that now, no matter what the interests of the state where
the injury occurs are, that state can apparently apply its own law
if it so desires, the full faith and credit clause to the contrary
notwithstanding. Oscar Fields.
COPYRIGHT LAW - FAIR USE - PARODY
Defendant, Jack Benny, produced on television, a fifteen-minute
skit entitled "Autolight," a burlesque of the plantiff's copyrighted
motion picture "Gaslight." The plaintiff sought to enjoin the de-
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fendant from further use of "Autolight," alleging that it was a
substantial taking of "Gaslight" material which constituted a copy-
right infringement. The defendant acknowledged that it was a sub-
stantial taking, but contended that since the taking was by bur-
lesque it was a fair use, and therefore was not an infringement.
Held: The taking is not a fair use, and thus is an infringement of
the copyright. Loew's Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 131
F. Supp. 165 (S.D. Cal. 1955).
The courts have never directly considered whether a burlesque
treatment of copyrighted material, substantially taken, consti-
tutes fair use; therefore substantiation of the decision in the prin-
cipal case must be drawn largely by reference to history and
statute.
Copyright law in the United States is wholly statutory, Bobbs-
Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908), based on Art. 1,
Sec. 8, cl. 8, United States Constitution, which grants to Congress
the power "To promote the progress of science and useful arts, by
securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive
rights to their respective writings and discoveries." The federal
copyright act purports to give a person complying with the statute
an "exclusive right" in his work. This right extends to "any man-
ner or method" of using his work. 35 Stat. 1075 (1909), 17 U.S.C.
Sec. 1 (1952).
The statute does not limit the privilege given to the owner.
However, in view of the constitutional intention "to promote the
progress of science and useful arts," the courts determined to
impose a restriction on the privilege, reasoning that unless more
freedom were allowed in the use of existing works that progress
-would in fact be hindered because authors would be limited or
deprived in the use of one of their most prolific sources of ideas.
The problem was that of insuring reasonable protection to the
copyright holder's interest and at the same time attempting to limit
his ownership rights in favor of society.
In an attempt to impose such a limitation, the courts arrived at
the doctrine of fair use which is now universally recognized.
Farmer v. Calvert Lithographing Co., 8 Fed. Cas. No. 4651, at
803 (C.C.E.D. Mich. 1872). Fair use is the right of limited use
of the copyrighted material by someone other than the copyright
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bolder. Tovsvig v. Bruce Publishing Co., 181 F.2d 664 (7th Cir.
1950). The basis for the doctrine of fair use was as a matter of
statutory interpretation, but the courts could have further justified
the doctrine by analogy to property rights which are qualified by
the public interest. For example, at one time ownership of real
property was considered absolute, and the landowner owed no
duty to his neighbors of reasonable use of his land. But the abso-
lute right became qualified so that a duty was owed as exemplified
by the law of nuisance. The qualifications are imposed as a matter
of public policy just as the doctrine of fair use is imposed in the
interests of society.
A single rule governing the application of the doctrine of fair
use cannot be formulated. Cohen, Fair Use in the Law of Copy.
right, A.S.C.A.P. COPYRIGHT LAW SYMPOSIUM, 53, (1955). Of
the several rules governing fair use, the rule of substantial taking
offers the best guide in adjudging infringement, because the
amount of the material taken from the copyrighted work is readily
discernible. As a general rule, a substantial appropriation of copy-
righted material constitutes an infringement. Universal Pictures
Co. v. Harold Lloyd Corp., 162 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1947). How-
ever, there is an exception to this rule where the appropriation is
for reasonable criticism. Henry Holt and Co. v. Liggett and Meyers
Tobacco Corp., 23 F. Supp. 302 (E.D. Pa. 1938).
The defendant in the principal case sought to have parody
treated as another exception to the general rule that a substantial
appropriation is not a fair use. However, parodies, like other
appropriations, involve the taking of phrases and sequences of
ideas. Since the mood of parody in which the material is used
does not separate the material from its source, the taking of a
copyrighted material for a parody should be subject to the same
rules of infringement as any other appropriation. Such seems to
have been the opinion of the courts in the four cases that have
involved parodies. Hill v. Whalen & Martell, Inc., 220 Fed. 359
(D.C. N.Y. 1914); Bloom & Hamlin v. Nixon, 125 Fed. 977
(C.C.E.D. Penn. 1903); Green v. Minzensheimer, 177 Fed. 286
(C.C.N.Y. 1909); Green v. Luby, 177 Fed. 287 (C.C.N.Y. 1909).
Thus when a question of an infringement is involved, it is nec-
essary to abide by the present substantial taking rule to decide
[Vol. 10
RECENT CASE NOTES
whether the taking is for the purpose of disseminating science and
useful arts through criticism. As satire and parody have been
used extensively as methods of criticism, a possibility exists that
parody might be written solely for that purpose and would then
be considered within the scope of the present exception to the
general rule. To determine the purpose of the parody the courts
seem to apply a subjective test to the intent of the writer. When
the test reaveals good faith and a striving toward the application
of art, the courts broaden their conception of the fair use doc-
trine. Conversely, when the test reveals bad faith or elements
wholly commercial, the courts narrow their conception of the doc-
trine. College Entrance Book Co. v. Amsco Book Co., 119 F.2d
874 (2d Cir. 1941); Harms v. Cohen, 279 Fed. 276 (D.C. Pa.
1922); Savage v. Hoffman, 159 Fed. 584 (2d Cir. 1908); Spring,
RISKS AND RIGHTS IN COPYRIGHT, 186 (1952).
It would seem that another exception to the substantial taking
rule would muddy the waters around the most helpful guide the
courts have. Thus it is submitted that the courts will adhere to the
present rule, but in its application will attempt to do justice by
either (1) emphasizing the commercial motive in the particular
case thereby narrowing fair use, or (2) deemphasizing that ele-
ment and adopting a broader definition of "criticism" so as to
cover good faith attempts at artful application. In essence then,
substantial use may become a pragmatic test striking a balance
between the right of the author to use the product of his intellect,
and the right of the public to the dissemination of knowledge and
the promotion and progress of science and useful arts which is
the constitutional mandate by which the American law of copy-
right originated. Yankwich, What is Fair Use, 22 U. CHI. L. REV.
412. Arthur C. Flinders.
CORPORATIONS - DIRECTORS - PERSONAL LIABILITY TO
THIRD PERSONS
Defendants, directors of a Texas corporation, passed a resolu-
tion empowering the president to borrow a sum of money and to
issue promissory notes. The notes were to provide for payments
out of the "first proceeds of any funds received by the corpo-
1956]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
ration as a result of the public offer of its stock." The notes were
duly executed, but the proceeds of the stock sale were used to pay
other creditors and for other corporate purposes. Payees sued
the directors of the now-insolvent corporation on two of the notes,
although there were no allegations of fraud or misappropriation.
Held: The provision for payment out of the stock proceeds created
an equitable lien on said proceeds, and the directors are person-
ally liable for the corporation's failure to pay the notes with the
proceeds. Emmert v. Drake, 224 F.2d 299 (5th Cir. 1955).
Directors of a corporation may expressly bind themselves to
pay the debts of the corporation, and such agreements obviously
lead to personal liability. Kessel v. Murray, 197 Iowa 17, 196
N.W. 591 (1924). But the general rule, in the absence of some
statutory liability, is that directors are not personally liable to
third persons for corporate debts, or for breach of contracts the
corporation may lawfully have entered. Snyder v. Wiley, 59 Tex.
448 (1883); Connally v. Lyons, 82 Tex. 670, 18 S.W. 799
(1891); Fletcher, 3 CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPO-
RATIONS 825 (1947).
The court in the principal case has seen fit to depart from this
rule, and does so by finding an equitable lien. To sustain such
finding the court cites Simpson v. Amarillo Mt. Benev. Ass'n, 68
S.W.2d 597 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924), where a court order to pay
from a specific fund created an equitable lien on the fund. In
the absence of a court order, there is substantial authority to
indicate that a mere promise to pay a debt from a certain fund
will not create an equitable lien. Patterson v. Citizens Nat. Bank
of Lubbock, 236 S.W. 130 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922); Lone Star
Cement Corp. v. Swartwaut, 93 F.2d 767 (4th Cir. 1938); In re
Additional Approach to Triborough Bridge, 12 N.Y.S. 884, 257
App. Div. 267 (1939). However, if the promise can be interpreted
as manifesting an intention to make the fund security for the debt,
the lien is clearly established. Atlanta Nat. Bank v. Four States
Grocer Co., 135 S.W. 1135 (Tex. Civ. App. 191].), error refused;
First Nat. Bank of Chicago v. Southwestern Lumber Co. of New
Jersey, 75 F. 2d 814 (5th Cir. 1935); Kennedy v. State Industrial
Commission, 180 Okla. 514, 72 P. 2d 362 (1937). One Texas
case found the promise alone sufficient manifestation to create the
[Vol. lO
RECENT CASE NOTES
lien. Gardner v. Planters' Nat. Bank of Honey Grove, 118 S.W.
1146 (Tex. Civ. App. 1909), error refused. However, even if the
existence of the lien in the principal case is conceded, it is never-
theless difficult to discover how such lien made the directors per-
sonally liable since a lien only has the effect of encumbering cer-
tain property and not of charging the persons liable for the debt
secured by the lien.
In the application of tort principles to corporation law, it is
well-established that directors owe a duty of ordinary care to the
corporation in the management of corporate affairs. Green v. Hall,
228 S.W. 183 (Tex. Comm. App. 1921). Yet in the principal case
no corporate cause of action was involved, as third persons were
suing the directors. Some courts have denied the existence of a
duty running from the directors to those who engage in transac-
tions with the corporation, particularly where there is no deceit
or other fraud. Zinn v. Mendel, 9 W. Va. 580 (1876); Hart v.
Hanson, 14 N.D. 570, 105 N.W. 942 (1905). Fear is frequently
expressed that such liability would interfere with the freedom
of business discretion which is essential to corporate management.
When the corporation becomes insolvent the fiduciary duty of
directors toward the corporation has often been extended to credi-
tors, and directors are referred to as "trustees" for the creditors
of the insolvent corporation. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295
(1938). Some courts have held that the duty arises before actual
steps have been taken to wind up the corporate affairs. Bird v.
Magowan, 58 N.J.E. 180, 43 Atl. 278 (1898). The Texas deci-
sions hold, however, that a corporation is not insolvent without
some positive act of insolvency, such as the making of a general
assignment for creditors. Until then, the fiduciary relation "... is
in favor of the corporation alone." Conway v. Bonner, 100 F. 2d
786 (5th Cir. 1939), certiorari denied 307 U.S. 632 (1939). No
evidence of such "positive act" is indicated in the principal case,
so liability must rest on other principles.
Texas courts, apparently following the weight of American
authority, have on occasion found directors liable to third parties
in the absence of insolvency, ".... but the rule as to such liability
is largely relative." McCollom v. Dollar, 213 S.W. 259 (Tex.
Comm. App. 1919). Fraudulent misrepresentations of the corpo-
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ration's solvency has been held to place personal liability on the
directors when they knew of the falsity, or should have known in
the exercise of their official duties. Kinkler v. Jurica, 84 Tex.
116, 19 S.W. 359 (1892); Durham v. Wichita Mill & Elevator
Co., 202 S.W.2d 138 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918), error refused. Lia-
bility has been extended to participation in or sanctioning of
conversion of corporate stock, Bower v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 S.W.
2d 708 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929) error refused; and knowingly
mingling funds collected for and belonging to another with funds
of the corporation. McCollom v. Dollar, supra.
Limitations on the director's personal liability, however, have
often been emphasized. When injury to a third person has been
caused by acts of subordinates unknown to the directors, or by
conduct of the directors in the exercise of due care, a cause of
action against the directors is not allowed. Economy Filling Stn.
v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 3 S.W.2d 832 (Tex. Civ. App.
1928), error dism.; Peter v. First Nat. Bank, 92 S.W.2d 1079
(Tex. Civ. App. 1936). In other words, liability does not exist
by virtue of the corporation-director relationship in and of itself.
If the directors are negligent, there is some authority to indicate
that mere mismanagement will not create liability if the board
has acted in good faith. Cameron v. First Nat. Bank of Galveston,
194 S.W. 469 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917) error refused; 2 THOMPSON
ON CORPORATIONS, supra, 951. See annotation of cases 50 A.L.R.
462. On the other hand, some opinions have held that negligence
will give creditors a cause of action against the directors. McCol-
loin v. Dollar, supra. On agency principles, the distinction be-
tween misfeasance and nonfeasance has occasionally been held to
control, with liability for the latter existing only to the corporation.
Conrick v. Houston Civic Opera Ass'n, 99 S.W.2d 382 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1936).
It is submitted that the holding in the principal case is rather
difficult to reconcile with Texas authority. The court, at the outset
of the opinion, excluded any issue of fraud or misappropriation,
the sources of liability in a large number of earlier cases. There
was no direct evidence of negligence, and even assuming a duty
of ordinary care owing to the payees-an assumption far from
certain-can we be sure that the use made of the proceeds was not
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in the best interests of a failing corporation? Such a question
would seem to be significant in view of the duty from director to
corporation.
William D. Powell, Jr.
CORPORATIONS- INSPECTION OF BOOKS AND RECORDS
BY AN Ex-DIRECTOR
The director of a corporation, who was not a stockholder,
brought a proceeding in the nature of mandamus to compel the
corporation to permit him to inspect its books and records. The
director suspected mismanagement and misappropriation of cor-
porate funds by an officer and a previous request to inspect had
been refused. While the proceeding was pending, a new board of
directors was elected and the petitioner was not re-elected to his
position as director. Held: The discharged director did not have
an absolute right, but could have a qualified right, to inspect cor-
porate books and records covering period of directorship if he
could show that such inspection was necessary to protect his
personal responsibility and interest as well as stockholder's inter-
ests. Dissenting, three of the judges were of the opinion that a
discharged director has no right whatsoever to inspect the books
and records. Cohen v. Cocoline Products, Inc., 309 N.Y. 119, 127
N.E.2d 906 (1955).
Demands made by directors or stockholders to inspect corpo-
rate books and records have produced extensive litigation in New
York courts. The stockholder has always been granted a qualified
right at common law to inspect all books of the corporation, and
with respect to the examination of the business books and records
of the corporation this rule is followed in New York today.
Schiller v. Flatbush Message Bureau, Inc., 108 N.Y.S.2d 828
(Sup. Ct. 1951). The right of the stockholder to inspect the stock
book, however, is now expressly given by Sections 10 and 113 of
the Stock Corporation Law and differs from the right given by
common law in that, inter alia, the stockholder is required to have
held shares of the corporation for at least six months preceding
the demand, or, in the alternative, to represent or hold five per
cent of the outstanding shares of the corporation. With regard to
1956]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
the director, the New York decisions have consistently held that
he is entitled to an absolute as distinguished from a qualified right
to inspect the corporate books and records. This right has been
upheld irrespective of motive, the justification being that it is
necessary for the proper discharge by the director of his fiduciary
duties to the corporate body and its stockholders. Overland v. Le
Roy Foods, Inc., 279 App. Div. 876, 110 N.Y.S.2d 578, affirmed
mem., 304 N.Y. 573, 107 N.E.2d 74 (1952); Halter v. Eagle
Fish Co., 296 N.Y. 808, 71 N.E.2d 774 (1947) (mem.). Whether
this right is as unqualified as the decisions would seem to indicate
is possibly open to question, for in Posen v. United Aircraft Prod-
ucts, Inc., 201 Misc. 260, 111 N.Y.S.2d 261 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1952), a director was refused examination because he
declined to apply for governmental security clearance as required
by law. But inasmuch as this was an extreme case, the law in
New York probably remains that the director's motives are imma-
terial. That the right of absolute inspection is not universally
accorded to directors is demonstrated by State ex rel. Paschall v.
Scott, 41 Wash. 2d 71, 247 P.2d 543 (1952), and Strassburger
v. Philadelphia Record Co., 335 Pa. 485, 6 A.2d 922 (1939),
these decisions holding in effect that the director must prove his
good faith before an inspection will be ordered.
A stockholding director, if voted out of office, would by virtue
of his holdings still possess a qualified right to inspect the books
and records. In the principal case, however, the director was not
a stockholder; hence, after his removal, any claim by him of a
right to inspect books and records must necessarily be based on
the sole ground that he was once a director. There seems to be
little question that a director loses his absolute right of inspection
if he is removed from office before or during the proceeding to
compel inspection. Overland v. LeRoy Foods, Inc., supra; Halter
v. Eagle Fish Co., supra. Neither of these cases considered the
possibility of the nonstockholding director retaining a qualified
right. In the instant case, the majority of the court reasoned that,
notwithstanding his removal, the discharged director should have
a qualified right of inspection since there is the possibility that he
has incurred some personal liability for what transpired during
his term of office. Further, by permitting the ex-director to retain
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a qualified right of inspection covering the period of his director-
ship, not only will he be able to protect his personal responsibility
but such right could also very well inure to the benefit of the
stockholders by a disclosure to them of any derelictions by other
directors or officers. The dissent was of the opinion that since the
ex-director is neither a director nor a stockholder, he has no rights
at all as to inspection, regardless of motive.
The significance of the principal case lies in its decision, with-
out precedent in the field of corporation law, that a nonstock-
holding director retains a qualified right to inspect the corpora-
tion's books and records after termination of his directorship.
While admittedly an ex-director may under certain circumstances
be held personally liable for acts which transpired during his
term of office, it is submitted that such fact alone is weak support
for the decision that he retains a qualified right of inspection after
he leaves office. If a liability has been incurred while in office,
a subsequent inspection of the books and records would contribute
nothing toward safeguarding his interests, other than revealing the
liability, if previously unknown. Revelation of a prospective lia-
bility does not make the ex-director any the less liable. He can
do nothing until and unless suit is brought. If suit were brought,
sufficient opportunity to inspect should be available by means of
discovery procedures and at the pretrial examination. Further, the
standard which this decision lays down for the trial court to
follow, in exercising its discretion to grant or withhold permission
to inspect the books and records, seems too vague. The discharged
director is, in legal contemplation, a stranger to the corporation
and the present decision seems insupportable.
Wayne Wile.
CORPORATIONS - PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY - LIABILITY
OF PARENT FOR DEBTS OF SUBSIDIARY
The parent corporation was a co-operative organized under the
laws of New York to provide low cost housing to its member-stock-
holders, most of whom were veterans. A subsidiary was organized
to construct the proposed housing, with the parent corporation
being the sole owner of the subsidiary's stock and controlling all
1956]
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of the subsidiary's affairs. Building costs running higher than
expected, the subsidiary was unable to complete the houses under
construction. The subsidiary's creditors, pursuant to an extension
agreement, took over the construction of the houses. Four years
later the subsidiary went bankrupt. Representing the creditors, the
trustee in bankruptcy of the subsidiary brought suit to compel the
parent to meet the obligations of its subsidiary. The "outward
indicia" of the two corporations had remained separate during the
period that the creditors extended credit, and the creditors were
not misled. Held: the trustee in bankruptcy of the subsidiary cor-
poration can not compel the parent corporation to meet the obli-
gations of its subsidiary where no fraud, misrepresentation, or
illegality is involved. Bartle v. Home Owners Cooperative, Inc.,
127 N.E.2d 832, (N.Y. 1955), (6-1 decision).
The dissenting opinion pointed out that the stockholders of the
parent corporation, by having their homes constructed for them,
received something of value by virtue of their ownership of the
parent's stock, a benefit analagous to dividends. Under the cir-
cumstances, it was contended that the benefit to the stockholders
was a benefit to the parent corporation, implying that since the
parent corporation was to receive a financial benefit from its
subsidiary then it should be held liable for the debts of the sub-
sidiary incurred in connection therewith. It was also considered
of prime importance that the subsidiary could not possibly make
a profit since it was to sell the homes to the stockholders of the
parent at cost. With small capital furnished to the subsidiary by
the parent, it was inevitable that the subsidiary would eventually
become insolvent in the event of increased building costs.
The law permits the incorporation of a business for the very
purpose of escaping personal liability. Ohio Edison Co. v. Warner
Coal Corp., 72 Ohio App. 437, 72 N.E. 2d 487 (1946). This is
true even where the business to be conducted is recognized as
being risky, for this frequently is one of the main reasons for
incorporation, and, in the absence of fraud, is a legitimate one.
Almirall & Co. v. McClement, 202 N.Y.S. 139 (1923). An early
English case recognized that even a single businessman may
incorporate his business, holding all its stock, and still be afforded
limited liability. Salomon v. Salomon, [1897] A.C. 22. This gen-
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eral rule remains the same in the analogous situation where the
sole stockholder is another corporation. Gledhill v. Fisher & Co.,
272 Mich. 353, 262 N.W. 371 (1935).
The law seems to be more willing to "pierce the corporate veil"
in tort cases than it does in contract cases. In explanation of the
distinction it has been said that a party injured by the act or
instrumentality of the subsidiary is an involuntary creditor, and
the creditor by contract is a voluntary one. Latty, Subsidiaries &
Affiliated Corporation 201. It is reasoned that the contract credi-
tor, unless he is fraudulently misled by the failure of the two
corporations to outwardly maintain their separate existance, vol-
untarily risks the financial strength or weakness of the subsidiary
corporation with which he deals. But, except in unusual cases, a
party whose claim against a subordinate arises out of a tort places
no reliance upon the financial stability of the company before
its act or instrumentality caused him injury. The majority of these
tort cases speak of the subsidiary as the agent of the parent and
allow recovery on the theory of respondent superior. Lehigh Val-
ley R. Co. v. Dupont, 128 Fed. 840 (2nd Cir. 1904); Erickson v.
Minnesota & Ontario Power Co., 134 Minn. 209, 158 N.W. 979
(1916).
In cases where the parent has been held responsible for the con-
tractual liabilities of the subsidiary, the opinions almost always
speak of fraud as the reason for disregarding the corporate entity,
but when shorn of its irrelevant verbiage, the formula comes down
to this: liability will be imposed to avoid an inequitable result.
Latty, op. cit. supra 198. In the principal case, the court did not
think it would be inequitable to refuse to pierce the corporate veil.
However, the particular situation in the instant case suggests
the possibility of recovery against the parent on two other theories.
The parent corporation was the owner of a residential subdivision,
the lots of which were to be sold to the stockholders after the
houses had been constructed on them at cost. Presumably this
had not taken place at the time of the suit in litigation. The sub-
sidiary corporation might be compared to a building contractor.
If the separate existence of the corporations is to be recognized
and upheld, it would follow that the builder (the subsidiary cor-
poration) would be entitled to a mechanic's lien for the value,
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or the agreed price, of the labor and materials furnished in con-
struction. New York Lien Law § 3. But the subsidiary was unable
to complete construction. The court says that the creditors took
over construction pursuant to an "extension agreement," and pre-
sumably completed the houses. It would therefore seem that the
creditors also would have a right to a mechanic's lien for the value
of the labor and materials furnished by them, in addition to being
subrogated to the insolvent subsidiary's lien rights, and that an
action to foreclose the lien could prevail against the parent cor-
poration.
It is not clear from the court's opinion whether or not the parent
corporation was to pay the subsidiary for the houses it constructed
or to merely reduce its equity in the subsidiary (and thus the
assets of the subsidiary) by simply receiving the completed homes.
The opinion does indicate that the parent furnished, in addition
to the initial capital of $25,000, "additional sums amounting to
$25,639.38." If this is considered payment for services rendered
and material furnished, the argument that the parent still owes
the subsidiary for the remainder of the houses is strengthened.
If not, the question of distribution of capital to the stockholder
corporation may come into play. The capital of the subsidiary
was converted into labor and materials composing the houses; the
houses, being on the property owned by the parent, became the
real property of the parent. The capital furnished by the parent
as stockholder, therefore, was returned in the form of houses, thus
depleting the assets of the subsidiary. As the debts of the sub-
sidiary became greater than its assets, the continued reduction of
its capital was illegal under New York Stock Corporation Law
§ 53, and the trustee in bankruptcy should be allowed to "follow"
this withdrawn capital and look to the stockholder corporation for
satisfaction. Cottrell v. Albany Card and Paper Mfg. Co., 142
App. Div. 148, 126 N.Y.S. 1070 (1911).
Robert H. Thomas.
DAMAGES - INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY - FEDERAL INCOME TAX
Plaintiff, a railroad empolyee, sued his employer for back and
knee injuries incurred while working. The employer requested the
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court to instruct the jury that any amount received by the plaintiff
as compensation for personal injuries would be exempt from
federal income tax and that the jury must take that into considera-
tion in arriving at its verdict. Held: The trial court did not err in
refusing the requested charge, even though Ohio law requires
instruction on any point of law pertinent to the verdict. Maus v.
New York, Chicago, & St. Louis RR. Co., 128 N.E.2d 166 (Court
of Appeals, Ohio, 1955).
The problem presented by this case is relatively new, in that
the decisions on the point have virtually all appeared since World
War II. The decisions have not reached a harmonious result, even
though it is well settled that compensation for personal injuries
is tax exempt. The Internal Revenue Code of 1954, § 104a, pro-
vides that, except as to amounts deducted as medical expense,
gross income does not include: "(1) amounts received under work-
men's compensation acts as compensation for personal injuries
and sickness; (2) the amount of any damages received (whether
by suit or agreement) on account of personal injuries or sick-
ness. . . ." The theory behind this tax exemption is that the sums
received are merely compensation to make the plaintiff whole
again. The amount received does not increase the recipient's
wealth, it merely replaces what he has lost, and thus the damage
award should not be taxable income to him. Technically it would
seem that compensation for loss of wages should be taxable, but
where a verdict is general there is on way of determining the
amount apportionable to wages, so that the entire verdict in prac-
tice is tax-free. Pfister v. City of Cleveland, 113 N.E.2d 366
(Court of Appeals, Ohio, 1953).
The jury is entitled to be instructed on the elements to be
considered in arriving at the proper amount of damages to com-
pensate the plaintiff for his injuries. These elements include hos-
pital expenses, pain and suffering, mental anguish, time lost from
work, loss of earning capacity, humiliation, disfigurement, incon-
venience, and physical incapacity. Gulf C. & S.F. Ry. Co. v.
Greenlee, 62 Tex. 344 (1884); Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v.
Ferris, 82 S.W.2d 229 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935, error dism.) As
the damage award is to be merely compensation for the loss sus-
tained, the jury has no right to consider matters which have no
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bearing on compensation, such as how the defendant acquired the
money to be used to pay the judgment or how the plaintiff will
use it. Wilmoth v. Limestone Products Co., 255 S.W.2d 532 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1953, Ref.n.r.e.). Since the jury is not to consider
whether or not the plaintiff will have to use part of the money to
pay the tax, an instruction on tax exemption is not pertinent to the
issues involved in the case.
The jury is not entitled to consider the tax exemption, at least
in connnection with the future taxes which the plaintiff would have
had to pay had he earned the money instead of receiving it as
tax-free damages. Stokes v. U.S., 144 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1944).
However, the courts have split on whether or not the jury is
entitled to a cautionary instruction advising them that the award
is tax free. The purpose of a cautionary instruction is to prevent
the jury from straying outside the limits set up by the evidence in
arriving at the proper amount of damages. Hart v. Kansas City Pub-
lic Service Co., 154 S.W.2d 600 (Mo. App. 1941). The argument
in favor of a cautionary instruction on the tax exemption is that
it is unfair to the defendant to let the jury speculate as to whether
the award is taxable, for that might cause the jury to boost the
award on the basis of a misconception. This is a decidedly minor-
ity view, and it is supported mainly by the case of Dempsey v.
Thompson, 363 Mo. 339, 251 S.W.2d 42 (1952), which was
followed by Hall v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 110 N.E.2d 654
(Ill. App. Ct. 1953). The majority view is illustrated by the
Illinois Supreme Court opinion reversing the above-mentioned
Hall case, 125 N.E.2d 77 (1954). The court reasoned that, even
though the requested instruction was a correct statement of the
law, it should not be given, because it was not material to the
issues involved in the case. In Texas there is dictum in one case
expressly favoring the rule of Dempsey v. Thompson, which would
permit a cautionary instruction on tax exemption at the discretion
of the trial court. Texas & N.O. Ry. Co. v. Pool, 263 S.W.2d 582
(Tex. Civ. App. 1953). However, there is a more recent case with
dictum to the contrary. Missouri-Kansas-Texas RR. Co. v. McFer-
rin, 279 S.W.2d 410 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955, writ of error granted).
To say the least, the rule to be followed in Texas is indefinite until
the Texas Supreme Court rules on the McFerrin case.
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The better rule would be to give no instruction at all on the tax
exemption, but to merely instruct the jury to follow closely the
evidence presented in arriving at the amount of damages. An
instruction to the effect that "(1) the jury is to find the present
worth of the gross wages that the plaintiff would have earned but
for the disabling injury, (2) the jury is not to deduct therefrom
any sum which it is thought the plaintiff would have to pay in taxes
if he actually earned such gross wages, and (3) the jury is not to
add to the amount so found any sum to compensate for supposed
reduction of the verdict by taxation," has been suggested by a
recent comment in this Journal. 8 SwLI 97 (1954). However,
even that instruction may be criticized for drawing the jury's
attention to questions of taxation and tax-exemption. A cautionary
instruction to the effect that the jury in computing the plaintiff's
damages should consider only the evidence before it would be
unobjectionable, but such instruction might not deter the jury from
mistakenly considering the tax aspect of the award on its own
initiative. However, it must be assumed that the jury will follow
the judge's instructions.
Robert N. Best.
LABOR LAW - NRLB ELECTIONS - ELIGIBILITY OF EMPLOYEES
TO VOTE DURING STRIKE
There was a strike in progress at a manufacturing plant; an
election was held by the NLRB to determine the bargaining agent
of the striking employees. When the strikers appeared to vote, the
company challenged several on the ground that they had been
guilty of strike misconduct, and therefore were not entitled to vote
because of Sec. 9 (c) (3) Labor-Management Relations Act of
1947-61 Stat. 144 (1947), 29 U.S.C. Sec. 159 (c) (3) (1952).
The company had neither discharged nor replaced them. By count-
ing those challenged for strike misconduct, the NLRB established
a bargaining agent with whom the company refused to deal. Held:
The Labor-Management Relations Act Sec. 9 (c) (3) which states
that "Employees on strike who are not entitled to reinstatement
shall not be eligible to vote," includes only those whose reinstate-
ment rights have been destroyed by the employer's affirmative act
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of replacement or discharge. It does not include those gulity of
strike misconduct whom the employer could have replaced, but
did not. Union Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 221 F.2d 532 (D.C. Cir. 1955),
certiorari denied.
This was a case of first impression; in the absence of prior
decisions, the court looked to the legislative history of the bill.
H.R. No. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (c) (3) (1947); 93 Cong.
Rec. 4999, 5117 (1947) S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess.
25 (1947); THE NEW LABOR LAW, issued by the Bureau of Na-
tional Affairs, (1947). Mr. Taft, in presenting the Senate majority
committee report, discussed this section of the proposed bill nar-
rowly, in relation to an anomolous situation of multiple voting
which had arisen under the Wagner Act. Strikers who had been
replaced and were no longer entiled to reinstatement, nevertheless
had the right to vote to determine the bargaining agent. The mul-
tiple voting occurred when these strikers, as well as their replace-
ments, were allowed to vote for the bargaining agent.
The dissent chose to follow the general purpose of the Act, to
afford peaceful settlements of disputes, rather than the specific
purpose of Sec. 9 (c) (3), to prevent multiple voting, as indicated
in the legislative history. However, it would seem that the rule
advocated by the dissent would in effect place a penalty on the
strikers who, though guilty of strike misconduct, were nevertheless
allowed to return to work, by denying them their vote for the
bargaining agent.
Prior decisions on the right to reinstatement are numerous.
Strikers remain employees while on strike, NRLB v. Mackay
Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1932), and are generally
entitled to reinstatment, unless guilty of strike misconduct, NLRB
v. Fansteel, 306 U.S. 204 (1939); this rule is applicable whether
the strike is economic, i.e., for wages, hours, and conditions, or
for the unfair labor practices of the employer, NLRB v. American
Rolling Mill Co., 126 F.2d 38 (6th Cir. 1942). It has been sug-
gested that the unfair labor practices should be investigated to
ascertain the nature and degree of provocation, if any, which may
have caused the strike misconduct; and, if these unfair labor prac-
tices are excessive and provoke the strike misconduct, the guilty
[Vol. I0
RECENT CASE NOTES
employees should be allowed to return to work. 52 Harv. L. Rev.
1326.
Where the strike is economic in nature, as distinguished from
a strike provoked by an unfair labor practice, the general right
of an employee to reinstatement does not apply if he has been
replaced. Conversely, the employer's obligation to reinstate em-
ployees on an economic strike extends only to those who have not
been replaced during the strike. NLRB. v. Mackay, supra. The
Act does not interfere with the employer's normal exercise of his
right to select employees or to discharge them so long as his action
is not discriminatory against collective activity, NLRB v. Blue
Bell-Globe Mfg. Co., 120 F.2d 974 (4th Cir. 1941). If the strike
is for unfair labor practices, however, the employer, in the
absence of strike misconduct, must rehire all of the employees on
strike, even if this means discharging employees who have been
hired during the strike to take their place, NLRB v. Remington
Rand, 130 F.2d 919 (2d Cir. 1942).
In firing or refusing to rehire striking employees, the case law
prior to the adoption of Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947
required the employer to act, and silence or acquiescence accom-
plished nothing. The employer must assert that the employee is
not entitled to reinstatement because of strike misconduct, or he
cannot object to his returning to work under an NLRB order,
NLRB v. Bradford Dyeing Asso., 310 U.S. 318 (1940); the
employer may waive his rights to fire because of misconduct by
allowing the employee to continue his work, Durr v. Clear Lake
Park, 205 Ia. 229, 218 N.W. 54 (1928); the employer must show
the individual guilt of the employee he refuses to reinstate, and
not simply that the strikers generally were guilty of misconduct,
NLRB v. Colten, 105 F.2d 179 (6th Cir. 1939). The employer
can readmit some employees who are guilty of misconduct while
at the same time refusing to admit others who are equally as
guilty, so long as there is no anti-union discrmination, NLRB v.
Fansteel, supra. These cases clearly show that the guilt of the
strikers alone does not terminate their employment, but to effect
a discharge the employer must act upon that guilt.
Of course the employer can effectively challenge persons ap-
pearing to vote on the ground that they are not employees. It
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would seem that under the holding in the principal case Sec. 9 (c)
(3) simply gives the employer the right to fire prior to the vote
for the bargaining agent those strikers guilty of strike misconduct,
and thereby terminate their status as employees. Sec. 9 (c) (3)
does not affect the ascertainment of those who are or who are not
entitled to reinstatement; this problem will be determined before
Sec. 9 (c) (3) is invoked. It might be argued that since Sec. 9 (c)
(3) is phrased in terms of the right to reinstatement and makes no
mention of actual discharge of the employee, an employee guilty
of strike misconduct but not actually discharged has lost his right
to reinstatement, and therefore is not eligible to vote. However, the
decision in the principal case clearly requires affirmative action
by an employer if he wishes to avoid the situation of multiple
voting. But it is submitted that this decision will probably not
and should not otherwise affect the case law on the right to
reinstatement.
Neil J. O'Brien.
SALES - AUTOMOBILE DEALERS - ESTOPPEL
Plaintiffs, wholesale car dealers, bring an action to recover cars
from defendants who bought them from a retail dealer, relying
upon his possession as an indicia of title. The retail dealer had
not paid the plaintiffs for the cars and did not have title at the
time of the sale to defendants. Held: An owner, who allows a
known retail seller to have possession of his goods, is estopped
from asserting his title against a purchaser from the seller. Heas-
ton v. Martinez, .. Utah ....... 282 P.2d 833 (1955).
As pointed out by one dissenting judge, at common law in
order to hold that an owner had estopped himself from asserting
his title against an innocent purchaser of his goods, it was neces-
sary to show that the owner had clothed the fraudulent seller with
indicia of title. Pickering v. Busk, 15 East 38, 104 Eng. Rep. 758
(King's Bench 1812), (allowing broker to have possession plus
record title to hemp on wharf created an indicia of title and
estopped owner); Winakur v. Sapoun, 145 Atl. 342 (Ct. App.
Md. 1929), (allowing auto dealer to have possession plus record
title created indicia). Possession alone was never enough to create
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the necessary indicia of title, Wilkerson v. King, 2 Camp. 335,
170 Eng. Rep. 1175 (Nisi Prius 1809). The Uniform Sales Act,
§ 23, has confined this common law rule and the courts applying
it have followed the common law reasoning, Shere-Gillett Co. v.
Long, 318 Ill. 432, 149 N.E. 225 (1925).
The court in the principal case applied § 23 of the Uniform
Sales Act and reached the opposite result, saying that the plaintiffs
estopped themselves by giving a retail dealer possession of the
cars without any other indicia of title. This may indicate a new
trend in the field of estoppel brought on by the increasing demand
for finality in commercial transactions. The trend may be a good
one, but the court seems to be overlooking the necessary factor
of the buyer's reasonable reliance on the seller's possession which
is actually the most important element of any estoppel, Hawkins
v. M&J Finance Corp., 238 N. C. 174, 77 S.E. 2d 669 (dictum).
The court believes that since the Utah Motor Vehicle Code, U.C.A.
41-1-65, does not require dealers to secure certificates of title on
their cars, there was nothing to put the buyers on notice that the
seller did not have title. It is not, however, necessary that a buyer
be put on notice of a possible defect before he must investigate
his seller's title, but rather that he act reasonably and in good
faith, Nudge v. Supreme Court I.O.F., 149 Mich. 467, 112 N.W.
1130 (1907), or that he was without knowledge and had no means
to determine the facts, Atkinson v. Plum, 50 W. Va. 104, 40 S.E.
587 (1901).
The Texas Certificate of Title Act, TEX. PEN. CODE, (1925),
Art. 1436-1, is similar to the Utah Motor Vehicle Code, and the
Texas Supreme Court has held that it does not require dealers to
secure certificates of title for their cars, Motor Inv. Co. v. Knox
City, 141 Tex. 530, 174 S.W.2d 482 (1943). See also OPINION
-OF ATTY. GEN. 0-2065-A, 1941. Unlike the Utah courts, however,
the Texas courts hold that a buyer from an auto dealer is subject
to the act, even though the dealer is exempt, and therefore the
buyer mst receive a cerificate of title at the time of sale. If he
,does not, the entire sale will be void as set out in sec. 52 of the
act. Onwiler v. Burtrum, 236 S.W.2d 157 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950);
Deahl v. Thomas, 224 S.W. 293 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949) ref.
n.r.e. It seems unfair to a buyer to force him to demand some-
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thing the dealer will probably not have, and then say that the sale
is void if he does not receive it.
While the court in the principal case seems to go to one extreme
in finding an estoppel solely from the fact of possession by the
dealer with no investigation by the buyer necessary, the Texas
courts seem to have reached the opposite extreme in requiring
the buyer to actually receive a certificate of title before there is an
estoppel. It is submitted that a better solution to this problem lies
between these two views. Mills v. Clark, 257 S.W.2d 746 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1953) ref. n.r.e., is the only case found which seems
to take the more reasonable approach that all a buyer has to do in
order to be bona fide is to make an application for the certificate
of title at the time of the sale instead of actually receiving it.
By correctly using the doctrine of estoppel the courts can
balance the equities between a wholesale car dealer who must sell
on the trust receipt basis and a retail car buyer who relies, and in
some cases reasonably so, on his seller's possession as indicia
of title.
Walter W. Steele, fr.
TORTS - NUISANCE - UNREASONABLE USE OF LAND
In an action for a restraining order and damage arising out of
nuisance plaintiffs alleged the following facts: Defendant exca-
vated a pond within 400 feet of plaintiffs' grain fields and placed
decoys and bait thereon to attract geese. Defendant was successful
in attracting 200 wild geese the first winter, 1,200 the next and
3,000 during the third. These geese foraged upon plaintiffs' grain
crops, thereby damaging them to the value of $48 the first year,
$105 the second and $1,343 during the third year. Defendant's
demurrer, which advocated that there could be no cause of action
where plaintiff alleged neither an unlawful nor negligent act upon,
defendant's part and where the damages were done by animals
ferae naturae, was sustained by the trial court. Held: (one judge
dissenting) the complaint stated a cause of action. Andrews v.
Andrews- ......-N.C ....... , 88 S.E.2d 88 (1955).
The majority opinion is built upon the broad foundation that
one must use his property so as not to injure that of another. From
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this premise a private nuisance is found where the land, property
or rights of another are injured by the improper use of one's own
land. Though a pond is not a nuisance per se, a private nuisance
per accidens (in fact) could be shown by reason of its location
and the manner in which it is used. They reiterate that negligence
is not a necessary element of nuisance, and point out that "most
nuisances per accidens are redressed without allegation or proof
of negligence." The dissent merely points out that defendant can
not be held liable for the trespasses of animals ferae naturae.
The principle that one must use his property so as not to injure
that of another is in sharp conflict with the principles of absolute
ownership. Because of the latter doctrine, the former principle is
limited to the extent that one is not entirely prohibited from using
his property in such a way as to damage his neighbor, Hoover v.
Horton, 209 S.W.2d 646 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948), and that the use
of property is usually limited only to the extent that the property
owner is not allowed to infringe upon the legal rights of adjacent
owners. Texas and N.O.R. Co. v. Davis, 60 S.W.2d 505 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1933).
In a number of jurisdictions, including Texas, it is specifically
held that there is no imposition of the absolute liability of the
Fletcher v. Rylands doctrine. Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Oakes,
94 Tex. 155, 58 S.W. 999 (1900).
When use is reasonable, lawful and without negligence, the
adjacent property owner may not complain. As neither unlawful
nor negligent use were alleged in the principal case, this line of
reasoning would require that defendant's acts be unreasonable if
plaintiff is to recover. In determining reasonableness in this con-
nection, the test has been held to be whether an ordinary person
would make a similar use considering the importance of the use
and the amount of the damages inflicted. Gray v. Woodring Lum-
ber Co., 197 S.W. 231 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917) error refused.
Plaintiffs' allegations of damages coupled with defendant's failure
to state the purpose of his use would seem to establish a prima
facie case that defendant's actions were unreasonable. Indeed the
court seems to be substantially influenced by the magnitude of the
potential damages to plaintiffs' crops should "[t]he arm of the
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law [be] too short [or] too weak to reach out to the pond and
take away the wild geese maintained ... to atract their kind in
ever increasing numbers."
Upon first reading the reasoning of the defendant and dissent-
ing justice seems overwhelming logical. The defendant was guilty
of neither an unlawful nor negligent act, and certainly a man
should not be held for the trespass of wild geese in which it was
not even alleged defendant had a property right. However, nui-
sance can arise from an unreasonable though non-negligent act
and requires no physical trespass for recovery. As Justice Cardozo
so eloquently expressed it, "Nuisance . . . does not involve the
element of negligence as one of its essential factors. One acts some-
times at one's peril. In such circumstances, the duty to desist is
absolute whenever conduct, if persisted in, brings damage to an-
other." McFarlane v. City of Niagara Falls, 247 N.Y. 340, 160
N.E. 391 (1928) citing McCarty v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co.,
189 N.Y. 40, 81 N.E. 549 (1907). If, as in the McCarty case,
mere noxious odors provide such circumstances as to be compen-
sable, certainly an action should accrue for the damages arising
from hordes of gluttonous geese feeding upon plaintiffs' grain
at the open invitation of defendant.
The principal case seems to reflect the current outlook of the
majority of American jurisdictions upon the question of absolute
liability. Though rejecting the doctrine of Fletcher v. Rylands,
L.R. 3 H.L. (E. & I. App.) 330 (1868), they reach substantially
the same result by finding a nuisance where one is damaged by
another's non-negligent act. Such holdings as that in the present
case seem thinly disguised when compared to the Fletcher v. Ry-
lands doctrine that "the person who for his own purpose brings
on his land and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mis-
chief . . . is prima facie answerable for all the damage which is
the natural consequence of its escape." Regardless of the basis for
the holdings, the principal case seems to be approaching both
Fletcher v. Rylands and the ancient command of Roman law "to




TORTS - WRONGFUL DEATH ACT - CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
OF ONE BENEFICIARY
Action was brought under the Wrongful Death Act by the
administrator of the estates of the deceased wife and child of the
defendant. The beneficiaries under the Act are the defendant and
his remaining child for whom the administrator is bringing the
action as next friend. The petition alleged that the defendant had
driven at a high rate of speed through a stop sign, causing a wreck
which resulted in the death of the wife and a child of the defend-
ant, and injuries to the remaining child of the defendant. Held:
The action under the Wrongful Death Act is barred because the
defendant is one of the beneficiaries and would share in the pro-
ceeds, thereby profiting from his own wrong. Nudd v. Matsoukas,
........ III --------- , 128 N.E.2d 609 (1955).
Under the common law, there is no recovery for the death of
a human being. Vanderford v. City of Houston, 286 S.W. 568
(Tex. Civ. App. 1926); Hill v. Shafty, 201 N.Y.S. 29, 121 Misc.
273 (1923). In order to alleviate this harsh rule, all jurisdic-
tions have passed statutes which will allow recovery when the
death is occasioned by a wrongful act of another. Smith v. Wil-
liams, 1 N.E.2d 643 (Ct. of App. 1925); Van Beeck v. Sabine
Towing Co., 300 U.S. 342, 346 (5th Cir. 1937).
The statutes granting recovery are of two distinct types. One
is modeled after the famous Lord Campbell's Act, generally creat-
ing a new cause of action which becomes vested in the benficiaries
upon the wrongful death. This type is what is commonly referred
to as the Wrongful Death Statute. Blocker v. Brown Express, 158
S.W. 2d 347 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942). The other type, Survival
Statute, generally provides for the survival of the cause of action
which the deceased would have had for personal injuries, if he
had lived. No new cause of action arises, as the cause of action
which the deceased would have had is merely transferred to his
personal representative. Marcus v. Huguley, 37 S.W.2d 1100,
(Tex. Civ. App. 1931) error dism.; Okmulgee Gas Co. v. Kelly,
105 Oki. 189, 232 P. 428 (1924).
The statutes almost universally require that recovery is for the
benefit of designated beneficiaries. McFadden v. May, 325 Pa.
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145, 189 A. 483 (1937); Gibson v. Solomon, 136 Ohio 101, 23
N.E.2d 996 (1939). The representative who brings the action is
said to be a statutory trustee for the beneficiaries, Streeter v.
Graham & Norton Co., 259 N.Y.S. 14, 144 Misc. 516 (1932);
Baltimore American Ins. Co. of New York v. Cannon, 181 Okl.
244, 73 P.2d 167 (1937), and he must distribute the proceeds to
the beneficiaries named in the statute. Murphy v. Province, 153
Ark. 240, 240 S.W. 421 (1922).
But, if the beneficiary contributes to the death, then the majority
of the courts will bar his participation in the proceeds, but will
allow the innocent beneficiaries to recover. Magnolia Petroleum
Co. v. Porter, 22 S.W.2d (Tex. Civ. App. 1929, error dism.), since
a contrary holding would allow him to profit by his own wrong.
However, some courts do not bar him from recovery, saying that
common law defense, such as contributory negligence, should not
be read into the statute to bar recovery. Bastedo v. Frailey, 109
N.J.L. 390, 162 A. 621 (1932).
Other courts will bar recovery to all beneficiaries when only
one of them is contributory negligent. Hazel v. Hoopeston-Danville
Motor Bus Co., 310 Ill. 38, 141 N.E. 392 (1923). The principle
behind such a holding seems to be conceived in the wording of the
particular statute which indicates that the proceeds recovered are
an entire and indivisible sum. Thus, these courts hold that recov-
ery of that sum must either succeed or fail as to the whole, and
cannot be apportioned as to innocent and negligent beneficiaries.
Texas courts take the view that the very purpose of the Act is
to compensate survivors of the deceased for the damage they have
suffered by reason of his death. Norman v. Valley Gin Co., 99
S.W.2d 1065 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936) error ref. No Texas cases
directly on point have been found, but it would seem that negli-
gence of one beneficiary would not bar recovery as to the innocent
beneficiaries under the Texas wrongful death statute, TEX. REV.
CIV. STAT. (1925), art 4671, 4672 and 4675. It provides that an
action can be maintained by "the surviving husband, wife, chil-
dren, and parents," of the deceased, and that each beneficiary must
show pecuniary loss before he can recover. Peavey v. Hardin, 288
S.W. 588 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926). This would seem to indicate
that each beneficiary is to be compensated for his individual
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pecuniary loss, the negligence of other beneficiaries notwith-
standing. The fact that Texas courts require joinder of the bene-
ficiaries is not inconsistent with the idea of a separate recovery.
Galveston-Houston Electric Ry. Co. v. O'Rear, 113 Tex. 456, 258
S.W. 803 (1924). Possibly, Texas courts could construe such
joinder much the same as do those courts which require that a
personal representative and a beneficiary, each given separate
causes of action by the particular statute, be joined. Under this
type of statute the Arkansas courts have held that despite such
joinder the recovery as to each must be separate, the negligence of
one not being a bar to the other's right of recovery. Sinclair Refin-
ing Co. v. Henderson, 197 Ark. 319, 122 S.W.2d 580 (1938).
If this result is reached by the Texas courts, then it seems quite
probable that the suit can still be treated as being by individual
beneficiaries and thus there is no apparent reason why the negli-
gence of one will bar the recovery by the others.
It seems that the Illinois legislature has come to this conclusion,
since the Illinois death statute, ILL. REV. STAT. 1955, Chap. 70,
Sec. 1 and 2 was amended subsequent to the principle case, so that
it is definite now that the contributory negligence of one bene-
ficiary will not bar recovery by innocent beneficiaries.
Malcolm E. Dorman.
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